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This thesis is an analysis of the effect of zoning laws and regulations on the price of 
residential housing. Economists Edward Glaeser and Joseph Gyourko have completed 
significant work on this topic. Their efforts have focused on the correlation of high 
housing prices with zoning laws and other land-use controls, but stop short of estimating 
the impact of zoning laws on actual housing prices in specific markets. This thesis 
expands on their research and estimates what residential housing prices would be without 
the regulations. It also estimates the deadweight loss (DWL) caused by the zoning laws in 
various high-cost markets. The results show significant price reductions from both 
complete and partial elimination of zoning restrictions. This thesis also uses these 
estimates to calculate the impact of the zoning laws on Basic Allowance for Housing 
(BAH) in the markets analyzed. Estimated BAH rates with zoning reduced or eliminated 
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Zoning laws and other land-use restrictions can have a significant impact on the 
price of housing. Housing costs can be decomposed into three elements; construction 
costs (CC), the cost of land, and the costs associated with obtaining the legal right to 
build a structure on the land (Glaeser, Gyourko, & Saks, 2005). Since 1970, construction 
costs for housing have declined in real terms, yet during that same period real housing 
prices in the United States have steadily climbed an average of 1.7% annually (Glaeser et 
al., 2005). In some markets these increases have been much greater. The main driver of 
this increase in housing costs appears to be government regulation in the form of zoning 
laws and various other types of land-use restrictions and taxes (Glaeser & Gyourko, 
2002). Many of these restrictions impose artificial limits on the supply of housing, and 
the result is housing prices that are well above the actual cost of construction and the 
implicit value of the land (Glaeser & Gyourko, 2002). Other types of land-use regulations 
act like a tax on the construction of new housing. Both forms of zoning regulation result 
in a higher market equilibrium price for housing, lower equilibrium quantity, and an 
associated deadweight loss (DWL). The aggregate effect of all zoning regulations and 
land-use restrictions in a metropolitan area is referred to as the zoning “tax.” The increase 
in price and the size of the DWL will vary depending on the amount of zoning regulation 
(size of the zoning tax), and the price elasticity of supply and demand.  
Glaeser and Gyourko (2002) proved that the steep prices seen in various high-cost 
housing markets was the result of zoning regulation as opposed to the traditional 
economic view of land scarcity. This paper furthers their research and explores the effect 
of zoning on housing prices, specifically calculating what the price would be without 
zoning or with a reduction in zoning regulation. In addition, the DWL that is associated 
with zoning regulations is calculated. A linear regression of the calculated DWL for each 
metropolitan area on an index that measures the level of regulation is conducted to test 
the correlation between DWL and the level of land-use restrictions. Lastly, the impact of 
zoning regulations on Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) rates, which is a sizeable 
portion of the Department of Defense (DOD) budget, is analyzed. Specifically, the 
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potential price reductions for housing from the elimination or easing of zoning 
regulations are applied to the BAH rate calculation methodology to determine what BAH 
rates would be without zoning regulation or with reduced zoning in the markets studied.   
Using the data from Glaeser and Gyourko (2002), a range of potential percentage 
price decreases is calculated for each market studied. There is no way to directly measure 
or calculate with complete certainty what housing prices would be without land-use 
restrictions. The method chosen in this paper utilizes Glaeser and Gyourko’s (2002) 
calculations for the implicit price of land from the hedonic method and the extensive 
value of land including zoning taxes. Comparing these two values gives the percentage of 
the median housing price that is above construction costs (CC) attributable to zoning 
regulation. The result is an implicit zoning tax percentage for each market studied. This 
implicit zoning tax percentage is then subtracted from the median housing price for 
owner-occupied housing from the 2012 American Community Survey (ACS) to calculate 
what the price would be without any zoning regulation, which is referred to as the 
equilibrium price (P). P for a 75% zoning reduction and a 50% zoning reduction is also 
calculated to give a realistic range for the amount of zoning regulation that could feasibly 
be eliminated in an effort by local governments to make housing more affordable. 
The median price of owner-occupied housing with zoning regulation is referred to 
as equilibrium price prime (PI). The equilibrium quantity supplied with zoning is called 
QI. These values are obtained from the 2012 ACS for the markets studied by Glaeser and 
Gyourko (2002). This paper uses a range of values for the price elasticity of housing 
demand (ηd) that have been estimated in previous studies by Muth (1971), Polinsky and 
Ellwood (1979), and Hanushek and Quigley (1980). The ηd values used are -.3, -.5, -.7, 
and -.9. With PI, QI, the calculated P values, and ηd, we can determine the quantity 
supplied without zoning regulation and for various levels of zoning reduction. This value 
is referred to as Q.  
With Q and P values for a 100% zoning regulation reduction and ηd of -.5, the 
DWL associated with the zoning tax in the various markets studied is calculated. This 
DWL represents the loss to society that is a result of the zoning regulations. A linear 
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regression is then performed of these estimated DWL values on the regulatory index 
values from Malpezzi (1996).  
The final portion of the paper examines how land-use restrictions affect BAH 
rates. The 2012 BAH rates for the markets studied are obtained from Defense Travel 
Management Office (DTMO). BAH rates are calculated using estimated median market 
rent prices for various types of dwellings depending on the rank of the service member 
and dependent status. The types of dwellings used range from apartments to detached 
single-family homes. The average cost of utilities and renter’s insurance is also factored 
into the BAH rate calculation. DTMO provides a BAH component breakdown that 
specifies an average percentage for the rent portion of the BAH rate in each market. This 
is the portion of BAH that is affected by zoning regulation. 
Rent and house prices are highly correlated. The rent-price ratio is the metric 
typically used to describe this relationship. The rent-price ratio is calculated by dividing 
average annual rent by median price. Historically, the rent-price has averaged 5%, with 
little variation (Davis, Lehnert, & Martin, 2008). Any reduction in the price of housing is 
going to correlate to a proportional reduction in market rent. Using the calculated implicit 
zoning tax percentage, BAH rates for a 100%, 75%, and 50% reduction to the zoning tax 
are estimated for each metropolitan area.    
 4 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. ZONING LAWS AND LAND-USE REGULATIONS 
The subject of zoning is a complex and vast subject that overlaps multiple 
academic areas, including economics, the law, and other social sciences. This paper 
focuses on the economic aspect of the zoning and land-use restrictions prevalent in 
municipalities across the United States. A brief history of zoning and its different forms 
follows. This paper uses the terms zoning and land-use restrictions interchangeably to 
describe any type of zoning law. 
According to Deakin (1989) there are five general categories of zoning and land-
use restrictions: 
1. Restrictions on location, density, and intensity of development 
2. Regulations on design and performance for lots and structures 
3. Costs levied on building developers for new construction 
4. Moratorium on development in specific areas 
5. Various controls on growth of buildings and population  
These categories are broad and include many different types of laws that control 
the use and development of land. The first category includes the traditional zoning for 
residential or commercial use of land. Also in this category are the laws that mandate 
minimum lot sizes and the type of residential structures (i.e. single-family detached, 
multi-family, apartment, etc.). Most zoning laws in this country prior to 1970 fall into this 
category (Fischel, 2004). The second category essentially covers the building codes. The 
third category includes fees levied by local governments on developers and the overall 
permit and approval process. This category can be considerably costly because of the 
delays that are involved. Categories four and five are land-use regulations designed to 
either prevent or control growth. Most of the zoning laws that fall under these last two 
categories have been implemented from the early 1970s onward, and generally in 
suburban areas of the United States (Quigley & Rosenthal, 2005). An additional category 
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of taxes on housing not related specifically to zoning includes the various regulations on 
the sale of previously existing homes such as inspection requirements, and property taxes. 
These restrictions significantly increase the transaction costs of selling a house and the 
cost of home ownership.  
The origin of zoning laws and land use-restrictions in the United States can be 
traced to the 19th century (Fischel, 2004). Land-use restrictions of some form have 
probably existed as far back as human beings have owned land as property and began 
creating laws to protect property rights. These early land-use restrictions were 
administered selectively and sparsely in various urban areas to address specific concerns 
such as fires (Fischel, 2004). Zoning laws as we know them today began in earnest 
between 1910 and 1920. The difference between the earlier land-use restrictions and the 
20th century version was their all-inclusive nature and their preference toward single-
family homes (Fischel, 2004). The earlier laws were only for specific areas of a 
municipality, while the laws that came about after 1910 typically zoned the entire 
municipality. The reason for this paradigm shift in zoning laws was the adoption of new 
transportation technologies that shifted the way that people travelled to and from work 
(Fischel, 2004). Prior to 1880, most people walked to work. Naturally, residential 
neighborhoods in urban municipalities tended to be close to the industrial areas where 
people worked. Industry in the cities had to be in close proximity to either the railroads or 
a port to move raw materials and finished goods. In the 19th century, there were natural 
limitations for the use of land because of these restrictions. The new forms of public 
transportation that began to change this were the electric rail car in the 1880s and the 
motorized bus and truck after 1910 (Cappel, 1991; Fischel, 2004). The electric rail car 
had the effect of enabling residential neighborhoods to be built further from industrial 
areas, but did not change the restrictions for the location of industry. Interestingly, the 
homogeneity of many neighborhoods built during this pre-zoning era before 1910 was 
strikingly similar to later zoned neighborhoods (Fischel, 2004). One possible explanation 
is that neighborhoods were typically developed in an orderly fashion around the rail car 
tracks; another, based on significant evidence, is informal agreements among developers 
and land owners that ensured that land uses were not mixed (Cappel, 1991). 
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The incarnation of the motorized bus and truck changed the landscape 
dramatically. Busses enabled any type of neighborhood (single-family, row houses, 
apartments, etc.) to be built without the need to be particularly close to the industrial 
centers where people worked or near to the rail car tracks. The truck had a much more 
significant impact because it enabled businesses to locate in areas away from the ports 
and railroads where land was less expensive (Fischel, 2004). The opportunity for 
commercial enterprises and less desirable apartment and multi-unit housing to freely 
develop in single-family residential areas is the true origin of 20th century zoning laws  
(Fischel, 2004). Existing residents’ fear of home price devaluation due to commercial or 
apartment development was the impetus for the new zoning laws. Interestingly, real 
estate developers of this era initially supported zoning because potential profits for zoned 
housing developments were higher than for non-zoned developments (Fischel, 2004). 
Zoning quickly spread from the cities to suburban municipalities during the 1920s. After 
the landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in Village of Euclid vs. Ambler Realty Co in 
1926 that upheld the constitutionality of zoning, it became nearly ubiquitous throughout 
the United States (Quigley & Rosenthal, 2005; Fischel, 2004). The zoning and land-use 
regulations that spawned across the United States after the Euclid decision heavily 
favored single-family homes and largely resulted in the exclusion of low-income 
residents by restricting the development of higher density housing units (Quigley & 
Rosenthal, 2005).  
Post WWII until the early 1970s gave rise to a massive development of suburban 
areas around the United States with no significant changes to the types of zoning laws 
and land-use regulations. However, the early 1970s marked a significant divergence in 
land-use regulations. Numerous municipalities across the country switched from 
controlled growth zoning policies to reduced growth and, in certain cases, no-growth 
policies (Fischel, 2004). Zoning laws aimed at preventing new housing development and 
population growth of any variety began to be implemented (Quigley & Rosenthal, 2005). 
According to Fischel (2004), the main driver of these new growth control regulations 
adopted by suburban municipalities was the completion of the interstate highway system. 
The interstate highways enabled immense mobility for Americans of all income levels. 
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Many incumbent homeowners viewed this mobility as a threat and the reaction was the 
prevention of any new growth in order to prevent the decline of housing prices in existing 
neighborhoods (Quigley & Rosenthal, 2005). There is no indication that land-use 
regulations prior to 1970 had any significant impact on the price of housing (Fischel, 
2004). This is because of the large number of suburban municipalities that 
accommodated controlled development prior to 1970. This accommodating attitude 
quickly shifted across the country to the exclusionary anti-growth zoning regulations that 
are prevalent today. The result has been a significant decrease nationally in the rate of 
new house construction and a corresponding increase in price (Glaeser, Gyourko, & Saks, 
2005).   
B. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ZONING LAWS ON HOUSE PRICES 
The various forms of zoning regulations all have the same net effect: decreasing 
supply and increasing the price of housing. This is accomplished in three different ways. 
The first is by directly restricting the supply of new homes, which results in a shift in the 
supply curve (see Figure 1). Zoning laws mandating minimum lot sizes and the outright 
restriction of any development will have this effect. The second method is an increase in 
the cost to build new houses due to fees and delays (note that this is different than 
construction costs, which refer to the actual materials and labor to build a house). The 
zoning regulations that levy fees on developers or delay the issue of permits due to 
bureaucratic processes tend to have this effect. According to Quigley & Rosenthal 
(2005), many municipalities apply expensive requirements and standards on potential 
developers for permit approval. These cost increases and delays act like a tax on housing 
and shift the supply curve by the amount of the tax (see Figure 1). The third influence 
these various land-use regulations have on housing supply is a slower response by 
developers to increases in demand and increased barriers to entry for new developers 
(Green, Malpezzi, & Mayo, 2005). The net effect is a decrease in the elasticity of the 
supply curve, resulting in an effective rotation (see Figure 2). All the different types of 
zoning and land-use restrictions lead to the same outcome: lower equilibrium quantity 
and higher equilibrium price (Glaeser & Gyourko, 2002). The focus of this paper is on 
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measuring the shift in the supply curve that results from zoning regulation and the effects 
on equilibrium P and Q.  
   
















Figure 2.  Decrease in Elasticity of the Supply Curve from Zoning 
Now that we have established how land-use restrictions affect the supply curve, 
we can analyze the incidence and the DWL of the zoning tax. The incidence of the 
effective zoning tax is determined by the price elasticity of supply (ηs) and the price 
elasticity of demand (ηd) for housing.   
The long-run price elasticity of demand for housing has received significant study 
and a fair amount of disagreement due to the multi-dimensional nature of the housing 
market and the difficulty in obtaining exact sales price data for analysis (Hanushek & 
Quigley, 1980). Despite this disagreement, there is consensus that housing demand is 
relatively inelastic, which makes sense because housing is a necessity with a limited 
number of substitutes. Additionally, housing transaction costs are significant, which 
reduces consumers’ responses to changes in price. Muth (1971) estimates the price 
elasticity of housing demand to be between -.51 and -.99. Polinsky and Ellwood (1979) 
estimate price elasticity of housing demand to be between -.56 to -.86, which is relatively 















Quigley (1980), who study housing consumption data of renters from Phoenix and 
Pittsburgh using two different models. Their simple model yields an estimate for price 
elasticity of demand between -.33 to -.95 for Pittsburgh and -.20 to -.71 for Phoenix 
(Hanushek & Quigley, 1980). Due to the significant variation in previous studies, this 
paper uses 4 different assumptions for the price elasticity of housing demand: -.3, -.5, -.7, 
and -.9. This captures the reasonable range of estimates from the three studies referenced.    
The traditional macroeconomic view is that the long-run supply curve for housing 
is perfectly elastic (Follain, 1979). Studies by Muth (1960) and Follain (1979) support 
this hypothesis. However, more recent studies break with this assumption and point 
toward an elasticity somewhere between 1.5 and 4 (Green, Malpezzi, & Mayo, 2005). 
Green et al. (2005) report a large variation in the price elasticity for housing supply in 45 
metropolitan markets across the country, ranging from .14 in San Francisco to 29.9 in 
Dallas. Their study shows a statistically significant correlation between price elasticity of 
supply for housing and the degree of land-use regulation, with the most heavily regulated 
cities showing the lowest elasticities and the least regulated cities showing the highest 
elasticities. Only 6 of the 45 cities showed inelastic supply. These findings are significant 
because they show the amount of influence zoning and other forms of land-use regulation 
have on the price elasticity of housing supply. The results also make intuitive sense since 
producers in a market with more stringent land-use regulations should be less able to 
respond to changes in price. The vast majority of cities in the U.S. have elastic long-run 
supply curves; however, the degree of elasticity varies considerably depending on the 
amount of land-use regulation. Many cities with moderate zoning regulations appear to 
behave as if they have nearly perfectly elastic supply curves (Glaeser, Gyourko, & Saks, 
2003). In a few extreme cases such as San Francisco, housing supply appears to be price-
inelastic (Green et al., 2005). For simplicity and ease of computation, and because the 
elasticity is generally very high, this paper makes the assumption of a perfectly elastic 
supply curve. 
A shift in the demand for housing, due, say, to population growth, a change in 
consumer tastes, or an increased availability of credit, will result in a larger increase in 
equilibrium price with the lower elasticities seen in the more heavily regulated markets. 
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A study by Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saiz (2008) yields this exact result. Glaeser et al. 
(2008) examined the two most recent housing booms from 1982 to 1989 and 1996 to 
2006. Their study concludes that during both boom periods, areas with more inelastic 
housing supply experienced significantly higher price increases than areas with more 
elastic supply.  
This paper focuses on the supply side of the housing market and shifts to the 
supply curve that result from zoning regulation. However, it is important to note the 
effect that land-use restrictions have on the price elasticity of housing supply and the 
impact this has on housing prices when there is an upward shift in the demand curve.     
As discussed earlier, the aggregate cost of all zoning restrictions and land-use 
regulations will be referred to as the zoning “tax”. This zoning tax is the amount that the 
supply curve is shifted as a result of these regulations. The incidence of the zoning tax is 
determined by the price elasticity of supply and price elasticity of demand. As mentioned 
earlier, housing demand is relative price-inelastic and the supply of housing is relatively 
elastic in all but a very few extremely regulated housing markets, San Francisco being the 
notable example (Green et al., 2005). The result is that a significantly larger share of the 
zoning tax is borne by buyers (see Figure 3). The portion of the zoning tax borne by buyers 
is depicted as a in Figure 3, while the portion borne by sellers is depicted as c. The buyer’s 
portion is many times larger than the seller’s portion. Developers pay the majority of the 
seller’s portion of the zoning tax since most zoning regulations are directed toward the 
development of new construction. The DWL of the zoning tax is depicted as b+d in Figure 
3. This DWL is a net loss to society.  It is the producer and consumer surplus loss from the 
housing not built due to the zoning tax. The elastic supply curve minimizes the portion of 
the DWL that is transferred from producer surplus, depicted as d. However, the inelastic 
demand curve results in a much larger portion of the overall DWL being transferred from 
consumer surplus, depicted as b. The result is a much larger amount of consumer surplus 
lost than producer surplus lost due to zoning regulation.  
Interestingly, only a portion of the zoning tax, depicted as a+c in Figure 3, is 
actually collected by the government as tax revenue. This is because a sizeable portion of 
the shift in the supply curve is due to land being withheld by municipalities for 
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development and delays to the approval process. So a large portion of the zoning tax can 
be viewed as a kind of DWL on top of the DWL depicted by b+d.   
 
Figure 3.  Incidence and DWL of the Zoning Tax 
Society as a whole loses due to the DWL created by land-use regulations. The 
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externalities caused by unregulated land development (Fischel, 2004). The problem with 
this argument is that urban conditions in the 19th century were arguably much worse than 
in the early 20th century. If negative externalities were the true purpose of ubiquitous 
zoning, it seems that the laws would have been established much earlier (Fischel, 2004).   
Undoubtedly, some negative externalities will arise from completely unregulated land 
development. These external costs are well documented by scholars, including Malpezzi 
(1996). However, it is unclear what the external costs are in each market and whether land-
use regulations are able to shift the supply curve to the socially optimal level. Additionally, 
there are positive externalities associated with the expansion of housing and homeownership, 
including increased productivity, employment benefits due to labor mobility, and 
racial/economic integration (Malpezzi, 1996). Many of the external costs identified by 
Malpezzi (1996) could be mitigated in other ways that are much more efficient and less 
costly than blanket land-use restrictions. For example, traffic congestion could be addressed 
by improving the transportation infrastructure or by using congestion pricing, as opposed to 
suppressing growth. In order for zoning regulations to achieve the socially optimal quantity, 
regulators require nearly perfect estimates of the external costs and the imposed regulations 
must be carefully tailored to prevent restricting supply past the socially optimal level and 
creating an even worse situation (Malpezzi, 1996). Unfortunately, the political processes that 
create these regulations are far from perfect and definitive measurements for negative 
externalities from housing development do not exist.  
My belief, for which, admittedly, I do not have overwhelming evidence, is that 
the external costs of housing development pale in comparison to the DWL imposed on 
society by the zoning regulations extant in many municipalities across the United States. 
One of the fundamental advantages of free markets is the efficient transfer of goods from 
a lower to a higher valued use. This is the reason that both sides gain from free and 
honest trade. Zoning regulation impedes the transfer undeveloped and under-developed 
land from a lower valued use to a higher valued use and this is a net loss to society.     
On an individual level, the losers from land-use regulation are all non-
homeowners, including prospective first time homebuyers and renters, and land 
developers. First-time homebuyers, without the sale of a previously existing home to help 
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offset the cost, must pay the bulk of the zoning tax as discussed earlier. Renters are 
forced to pay higher rents due to the positive correlation between rent and home prices 
(Davis et al., 2008). Developers as a whole lose due to the reduction in sales from land-
use regulations and their share of the zoning tax. Some individual developers may benefit 
from established political ties with local governments and preferential treatment in the 
approval process. This results in additional barriers to entry for new competition and the 
potential for monopoly rents by established developers (Quigley & Rosenthal, 2005). All 
other industries that feed the housing market, such as building materials suppliers, lose 
potential sales due to regulation.                
The group that gains from zoning regulation is existing homeowners. According 
to Ellickson (1977), suburban homeowners in some respects are like a cartel, enjoying 
monopoly rents in their local markets due to the inflated house prices from land-use 
regulation. This comparison may be extreme, but it helps to highlight what group is the 
true beneficiary of these regulations at the expense of everyone else. The true purpose of 
zoning is to inflate the values of existing suburban homes for the benefit of their owners, 
who happen to be zoning’s most fervent supporters (Fischel, 2004). Existing homeowners 
benefit from zoning regardless of whether they sell their home to realize the increase in 
value or not. This is because their house is considered an asset at the inflated market 
price. It can also be rented for a higher price, providing a greater stream of income than 
would otherwise exist without zoning regulations. Even if they elect to never sell, it will 
still be passed to their heirs.  
C. ZONING LAWS VERSUS LAND AVAILABILITY 
The traditional economic explanation for high-cost housing markets is the scarcity 
of land. The old saying “they’re not making any more land” describes this relationship 
quite well and represents the common belief about the root cause of high housing prices. 
However, one needs only to look at large cities around the globe such as New York City 
or Hong Kong to realize that land availability can become overcome quite easily by 
building up with multi-unit structures.  
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Glaeser and Gyourko (2002) show significant evidence that the cost of housing 
that exceeds physical construction costs in high-priced markets is primarily the result of 
zoning regulations as opposed to the free market price of land. They do this using three 
different methods. The first approach, which is the focus of this paper, is to calculate the 
price of land using two different methodologies and compare the results. They calculate 
these values for 26 metropolitan areas throughout the United States. Glaeser and Gyourko 
(2002) conclude that housing prices in the majority of the country are very close to 
construction costs. A few markets even have prices below construction costs. These rare 
cases are primarily cities with no growth or declining populations. However, there are a 
number of areas with housing prices that greatly exceed the price of construction, mostly 
coastal cities in California and cities in the Northeast.    
Glaeser and Gyourko (2002) break down the price of a house into three parts: the 
physical construction costs in materials and labor to build the structure, the free market 
price of the land, and the costs associated with obtaining the legal right to build a 
structure on the land (zoning tax). The first method they use is to calculate what they 
refer to as the intensive cost of land. They calculate the intensive cost by comparing the 
value of similar homes with different lot sizes and use the hedonic method to determine 
the actual free market price of the land per square foot of lot size in the 26 metropolitan 
areas. This value represents the free market price of land without the legal right to build a 
structure on it.  
Glaeser and Gyourko (2002) then calculate what they refer to as the extensive 
margin or imputed land cost. They calculate the imputed cost by first calculating the 
average construction costs for the median size and quality house in each metropolitan 
area studied. They then subtract the construction cost from the median owner occupied 
housing price, taken from the 1999 American Housing Survey (AHS). This difference 
represents the free market price of the land plus the zoning tax. The result is then divided 
by the average lot size in square feet. This yields the free market price of the land plus the 
zoning tax, all per square foot. The costs to obtain the legal right to build a structure 
encompass all of the various zoning and land-use regulations, and will be referred to as 
the zoning tax referenced earlier. Glaeser and Gyourko’s (2002) imputed cost, which is 
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the price of land plus the zoning tax, compared to the intensive cost, which is the free 
market price of the land, shows the cost of housing above construction costs that is from 
zoning regulation versus the amount from the scarcity of land. 
To clarify, consider a simple hypothetical example. Assume that the price of a 
house and the land it is on is $100,000. Assume also that the construction cost is $40,000. 
The remaining $60,000 represents the free market cost of the land plus the zoning tax. 
This is Glaeser and Gyourko’s imputed cost. Assume that their estimate of the free-
market value of land, which they call the intensive cost, equals $10,000. In that case, the 
zoning tax is $60,000 minus $10,000, which is $50,000.  
Their estimates show that the zoning tax is much larger than the free market price 
of land, with an average ratio of approximately 10 to 1. This means that the zoning tax on 
average makes up approximately 90% of the housing costs that are above physical 
construction costs. Theoretically, the imputed cost and the intensive cost should be the 
same in a perfectly free unregulated market because the zoning tax would be zero. 
Glaeser and Gyourko’s (2002) estimates are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1.   Intensive versus Imputed Cost of Land in 26 Metropolitan Areas 






Free	  Market	  	  
Cost	  of	  Land	  	  
per	  sq.	  ft.	  
(Intensive	  Cost)	  
Cost	  of	  Land	  +	  
Zoning	  “Tax”	  
per	  sq.	  ft.	  
(Imputed	  Cost)	  
Anaheim	   $312,312 $2.89 $38.99 
Atlanta	   $150,027 $0.23 $3.20 
Baltimore	   $152,813 $1.15 $4.43 
Boston	   $250,897 $0.07 $13.16 
Chicago	   $184,249 $0.79 $14.57 
Cincinnati	   $114,083 $0.89 $2.71 
Cleveland	   $128,127 $0.26 $4.13 
Dallas	   $117,805 $0.21 $5.42 
Detroit	   $138,217 $0.14 $5.10 
Houston	   $108,463 $1.43 $4.37 
Kansas	  City	   $112,700 $2.06 $1.92 







Free	  Market	  	  
Cost	  of	  Land	  	  
per	  sq.	  ft.	  
(Intensive	  Cost)	  
Cost	  of	  Land	  +	  
Zoning	  “Tax”	  
per	  sq.	  ft.	  
(Imputed	  Cost)	  
Miami	   $153,041 $0.37 $10.87 
Milwaukee	   $130,451 $1.44 $3.04 
Minneapolis	   $149,267 $0.29 $8.81 
New	  York	  City	   $252,743 $0.84 $32.33 
Newark	   $231,312 $0.42 $17.70 
Philadelphia	   $163,615 $1.07 $3.20 
Phoenix	   $143,296 $1.89 $6.86 
Pittsburgh	   $106,747 $2.28 $3.08 
Riverside	   $149,819 $1.35 $7.92 
San	  Diego	   $245,764 $0.58 $26.12 
San	  Francisco	   $461,209 $0.97 $63.72 
Seattle	   $262,676 $0.48 $18.91 
St.	  Louis	   $110,335 $0.63 $1.74 
Tampa	   $101,593 $0.19 $6.32 
 
The second approach used by Glaeser and Gyourko (2002) is to look at 
population density and test for a correlation between density and housing prices. The 
traditional theory that land scarcity is the driving factor behind high housing prices would 
imply that areas with higher population density have higher-cost housing. But Glaeser 
and Gyourko (2002) find no significant correlation between housing prices and 
population density. The final approach they use is a linear regression of housing prices on 
a measure of the degree of zoning regulation. They find a significant positive correlation 
between these two variables. That is, the more stringent the zoning regulations, the higher 
the housing costs (Glaeser & Gyourko, 2002). These last two tests strengthen the 
hypothesis that zoning regulation is the primary driver of high housing costs.  
 19 
III. ANALYSIS       
A. CALCULATION OF P WITHOUT ZONING TAX   
There is obviously no direct method to measure what the equilibrium price 
without zoning regulation (P) would be in different metropolitan areas. Therefore, it is 
necessary to take an indirect approach to derive P. The method chosen for this paper is to 
use the data from Glaeser and Gyourko (2002) to estimate the percentage of the median 
house price that is a result of zoning regulation and subtracting that percentage from the 
median home value from the 2012 ACS to derive P. Due to limitations of the 
metropolitan areas studied in the 2012 ACS vs. the 1999 AHS, only 25 of the 26 
metropolitan areas studied by Glaeser and Gyourko (2002) can be analyzed. Anaheim is 
the area omitted. The price and quantity data from both the ACS and the AHS are for 
owner occupied housing.  
The first step it to quantify the data for the 25 metropolitan areas from Glaeser 
and Gyourko (2002) in Table 1. Their estimate for the free market price of land per sq. ft. 
is in column 3 of Table 1. Column 4 contains their estimate for the free market price of 
land + the zoning tax per sq. ft. The difference between these two columns yields the 
zoning tax per sq. ft., which is displayed in column 3 of Table 2.   
The proportion of the cost of housing exceeding construction costs (CC) that can 
be attributed to zoning is the zoning tax ratio (column 4, Table 2). This is calculated by 
dividing the (zoning tax per sq. ft.) by (the free market price of land + the zoning tax per 
sq. ft.). Note that the zoning tax ratio for Kansas City is negative. This is likely due to the 
statistical variation from the Glaeser and Gyourko (2002) calculations for imputed and 
intensive values of land. This simply shows that the imputed and intensive land values 
are nearly the same because either the zoning tax in Kansas City is extremely low, or the 
city has no growth.  
The actual cost of housing exceeding construction costs (P-CC) is not displayed 
by Glaeser and Gyourko (2002). This value must be derived. After this calculation is 
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made, the zoning tax ratio can then be applied to (P – CC) to arrive at the implicit zoning 
tax percentage for each metropolitan area.   
In Glaeser and Gyourko’s (2002) original calculations for the intensive and 
imputed costs of land (see Table 1), they use the average residential construction cost per 
sq. ft. of house size from the R.S. Means Company for each metropolitan area. 
Unfortunately, they don’t list these values in their article and the original source was 
unavailable. The values cannot be derived because the imputed cost calculation is per sq. 
ft. of average lot size for each market studied, and the average lot size is also not listed. 
However, they do list the mean value for the construction cost of an economy home, 
which their calculations are based upon. This mean value is $60 per sq. ft., representing 
the average material and labor cost for residential construction. Obviously, this cost will 
vary from city to city. However, Glaeser and Gyourko (2002) indicate that the variation is 
not significant. Fortunately I was able to find data from a later study by Glaeser, 
Gyourko, and Saiz (2008), which lists construction costs for all 25 metropolitan areas in 
this study. These values were compared to the mean construction cost for all metropolitan 
areas to calculate the percent variation above or below the mean. This percentage for 
each metropolitan area was then applied to the average construction cost of $60 per sq. ft. 
to adjust the construction costs appropriately. I recognize that this is not the ideal method 
to calculate the original construction costs due to the potential differences in costs over 
time between the two studies. However, the time period is relatively short and the 
variation in residential construction costs across the United States is fairly small, as 
indicated by Glaeser and Gyourko (2002) and shown in their (2008) study, with a 
standard deviation of only $20,032 in total costs across the entire country. Any errors that 
result from the indirect calculation of construction costs should be minimal.1  
The adjusted construction costs per sq. ft. are displayed in column 5 of Table 2. 
The variation between metropolitan areas is relatively small, with a mean of $63.92 per 
                                                
1 The original source from the R.S. Means Company used by Glaeser and Gyourko (2002) became 
available to the author after calculations for this paper were made. Construction costs calculated using the 
newly acquired R.S. Means data were very close to the author’s original indirect calculations, with the 
former tending to be slightly lower in value. Therefore, the decision was made to use the original 
construction cost calculations as they provide a more conservative estimate.     
 21 
sq. ft. and a standard deviation of $6.99. New York is the only clear outlier, with 
construction costs more than two standard deviations larger than the mean. 













(per	  sq.	  ft.)	  
	  
Atlanta	   $150,027	   	  $2.97	   92.81%	   	  $55.71	  	  
Baltimore	   $152,813	   	  $3.28	   74.04%	   	  $57.41	  	  
Boston	   $250,897	   	  $13.09	   99.47%	   	  $72.20	  	  
Chicago	   $184,249	   	  $13.78	   94.58%	   	  $70.20	  	  
Cincinnati	   $114,083	   	  $1.82	   67.16%	   	  $57.37	  	  
Cleveland	   $128,127	   	  $3.87	   93.70%	   	  $62.07	  	  
Dallas	   $117,805	   	  $5.21	   96.13%	   	  $52.17	  	  
Detroit	   $138,217	   	  $4.96	   97.25%	   	  $65.08	  	  
Houston	   $108,463	   	  $2.94	   67.28%	   	  $54.96	  	  
Kansas	  City	   $112,700	   	  $(0.14) -­‐7.29%	   	  $63.62	  	  
Los	  Angeles	   $254,221	   	  $28.25	   92.81%	   	  $66.82	  	  
Miami	   $153,041	   	  $10.50	   96.60%	   	  $56.05	  	  
Milwaukee	   $130,451	   	  $1.60	   52.63%	   	  $63.58	  	  
Minneapolis	   $149,267	   	  $8.52	   96.71%	   	  $69.45	  	  
New	  York	   $252,743	   	  $31.49	   97.40%	   	  $81.01	  	  
Newark	   $231,312	   	  $17.28	   97.63%	   	  $69.71	  	  
Philadelphia	   $163,615	   	  $2.13	   66.56%	   	  $70.92	  	  
Phoenix	   $143,296	   	  $4.97	   72.45%	   	  $55.60	  	  
Pittsburgh	   $106,747	   	  $0.80	   25.97%	   	  $61.43	  	  
Riverside	   $149,819	   	  $6.57	   82.95%	   	  $65.76	  	  
San	  Diego	   $245,764	   	  $25.54	   97.78%	   	  $65.35	  	  
San	  Francisco	   $461,209	   	  $62.75	   98.48%	   	  $75.70	  	  
Seattle	   $262,676	   	  $18.43	   97.46%	   	  $64.52	  	  
St.	  Louis	   $110,335	   	  $1.11	   63.79%	   	  $64.22	  	  
Tampa	   $101,593	   	  $6.13	   96.99%	   	  $57.22	  	  
           
Actual construction costs for each metropolitan area are calculated by multiplying 
the adjusted CC per sq. ft. by the median sized house from the 1999 AHS. The 1999 AHS 
lists the median house size as 1704 sq. ft. The results are in column 3 of Table 3. 
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The calculated construction cost for a 1704 sq. ft. house is subtracted from the 
median house price from the 1999 AHS to derive (P-CC), displayed in column 4 of Table 
3. As expected, there is significant variation in the (P-CC) values. They range from just 
under $1,000 in St. Louis to over $300,000 in San Francisco. 
The implicit zoning tax percentage is calculated by first multiplying (P-CC) by 
the zoning tax ratio from Table 2. This value is then divided by median house price from 
the 1999 AHS. The result is the implicit zoning tax percentage displayed in column 5 of 
Table 3. The implicit zoning tax percentage represents the estimated portion of the 
median house price from the 1999 AHS that is the zoning tax, based on the original 
calculations by Glaeser and Gyourko (2002).   
Table 3.   Implicit Zoning Tax Percentage 








(1704	  sq.	  ft.	  
House)	  	  





Atlanta	   $150,027 	  $94,932	   	  $55,095	   34.08% 
Baltimore	   $152,813 	  $97,818	   	  $54,995	   26.65% 
Boston	   $250,897 	  $123,026	   	  $127,871	   50.69% 
Chicago	   $184,249 	  $119,627	   	  $64,622	   33.17% 
Cincinnati	   $114,083 	  $97,754	   	  $16,329	   9.61% 
Cleveland	   $128,127 	  $105,772	   	  $22,355	   16.35% 
Dallas	   $117,805 	  $88,902	   	  $28,903	   23.58% 
Detroit	   $138,217 	  $110,903	   	  $27,314	   19.22% 
Houston	   $108,463 	  $93,649	   	  $14,814	   9.19% 
Kansas	  City	   $112,700 	  $108,402	   	  $4,298	   -­‐0.28% 
Los	  Angeles	   $254,221 	  $113,854	   	  $140,367	   51.24% 
Miami	   $153,041 	  $95,509	   	  $57,532	   36.31% 
Milwaukee	   $130,451 	  $108,338	   	  $22,113	   8.92% 
Minneapolis	   $149,267 	  $118,344	   	  $30,923	   20.03% 
New	  York	   $252,743 	  $138,036	   	  $114,707	   44.21% 
Newark	   $231,312 	  $118,793	   	  $112,519	   47.49% 
Philadelphia	   $163,615 	  $120,846	   	  $42,769	   17.40% 
Phoenix	   $143,296 	  $94,740	   	  $48,556	   24.55% 









(1704	  sq.	  ft.	  
House)	  	  





Riverside	   $149,819 	  $112,058	   	  $37,761	   20.91% 
San	  Diego	   $245,764 	  $111,353	   	  $134,411	   53.48% 
San	  Francisco	   $461,209 	  $128,992	   	  $332,217	   70.94% 
Seattle	   $262,676 	  $109,941	   	  $152,735	   56.67% 
St.	  Louis	   $110,335 	  $109,428	   	  $907	   0.52% 
Tampa	   $101,593 	  $97,497	   	  $4,096	   3.91% 
 
The final step in calculating the equilibrium price without zoning regulation (P) is 
to apply the implicit zoning tax percentage to the median house price from the 2012 ACS. 
The 2012 ACS median house price is the equilibrium price with zoning regulation (PI). 
The implicit zoning tax percentage multiplied by PI yields the price of the zoning tax. 
Subtracting this value from PI results in the estimated equilibrium price with a 100% 
reduction in the zoning tax (P). P is displayed in Column 3 of Table 4.  
The estimated price reduction shown in Table 4 is nothing short of remarkable. 
The thought of a $209,000 median house price in the San Francisco metropolitan area is 
almost unimaginable. These figures show the sad reality of the regulatory regime in many 
of these high cost areas. The artificial restrictions on supply that are keeping house prices 
elevated to the benefit of incumbent homeowners at the expense of renters and potential 
buyers is unfortunate.    
Eliminating government regulation has historically been a challenging endeavor.  
The feasibility of a complete elimination of land-use restrictions in many municipalities 
is quite low. However, a realistic estimate of what house prices would look like without 
zoning is a valuable statistic because it puts a real dollar value on the significant costs 
that zoning regulations impose. For proponents of housing affordability, these estimates 
can be used to guide efforts to make housing more affordable by reducing government 
regulation. Estimates of equilibrium price for a 75% reduction (P75) and a 50% reduction 
(P50) in zoning regulation have also been calculated by adjusting the implicit zoning tax 
percentage accordingly. These values are in columns 4 and 5 of Table 4, respectively. 
This gives a realistic range for potential price reductions that are in line with feasible 
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land-use reform efforts. Complete elimination of the zoning tax may be impractical, but a 
50 percent reduction may be possible and the effect is still significant, especially in the 
very high-cost markets as seen in Table 4. Zoning regulations such as permit fees, 
mandatory waiting periods, and moratorium on development could be partially reduced. 
The estimated equilibrium price for any percentage of zoning reduction can be calculated 
by adjusting implicit zoning tax percentage.      






















Atlanta	   	  $160,800	   	  $105,993	   	  $119,695	   	  $133,397	   
Baltimore	   	  $271,100	   	  $198,863	   	  $216,922	   	  $234,981	   
Boston	   	  $356,500	   	  $175,775	   	  $220,956	   	  $266,137	   
Chicago	   	  $215,100	   	  $143,748	   	  $161,586	   	  $179,424	   
Cincinnati	   	  $151,800	   	  $137,208	   	  $140,856	   	  $144,504	   
Cleveland	   	  $139,400	   	  $116,609	   	  $122,307	   	  $128,005	   
Dallas	   	  $158,200	   	  $120,890	   	  $130,218	   	  $139,545	   
Detroit	   	  $77,200	   	  $62,363	   	  $66,072	   	  $69,782	   
Houston	   	  $141,400	   	  $128,407	   	  $131,655	   	  $134,904	   
Kansas	  City	   	  $156,000	   	  $156,434	   	  $156,325	   	  $156,217	   
Los	  Angeles	   	  $399,500	   	  $194,788	   	  $245,966	   	  $297,144	   
Miami	   	  $181,500	   	  $115,592	   	  $132,069	   	  $148,546	   
Milwaukee	   	  $192,900	   	  $175,690	   	  $179,993	   	  $184,295	   
Minneapolis	   	  $203,700	   	  $162,890	   	  $173,092	   	  $183,295	   
New	  York	   	  $450,300	   	  $251,242	   	  $301,007	   	  $350,771	   
Newark	   	  $356,700	   	  $187,305	   	  $229,654	   	  $272,003	   
Philadelphia	   	  $244,000	   	  $201,545	   	  $212,159	   	  $222,773	   
Phoenix	   	  $156,100	   	  $117,778	   	  $127,359	   	  $136,939	   
Pittsburgh	   	  $124,300	   	  $123,675	   	  $123,832	   	  $123,988	   
Riverside	   	  $214,100	   	  $169,336	   	  $180,527	   	  $191,718	   
San	  Diego	   	  $386,400	   	  $179,766	   	  $231,424	   	  $283,083	   
San	  Francisco	   	  $719,800	   	  $209,208	   	  $336,856	   	  $464,504	   
Seattle	   	  $325,200	   	  $140,910	   	  $186,982	   	  $233,055	   
St.	  Louis	   	  $155,200	   	  $154,386	   	  $154,590	   	  $154,793	   
Tampa	   	  $132,400	   	  $127,223	   	  $128,517	   	  $129,812	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B.  CALCULATION OF Q WITHOUT ZONING TAX  
In order to calculate the equilibrium quantity supplied without zoning (Q) it is 
necessary to know the price elasticity of housing demand (ηd). As discussed earlier, a 
range of estimates will be used based on multiple studies on the subject. The values used 
are -.3, -.5, -.7, and -.9. Q will vary depending on the ηd assumption. The equilibrium 
quantity supplied with zoning (QI) and the equilibrium price with zoning (PI) are from the 
2012 ACS. The estimates for P at various levels of zoning reduction are summarized in 
Table 4. Estimates for Q are calculated for a 100%, 75%, and 50% reduction to the 
zoning tax at each ηd value.  
The price elasticity of demand (ηd) is defined as the percent change in quantity 
divided by the percent change in price (Equation 1).  
  (1) 
This equation can be expanded, where ΔQ is the difference between Q and QI and ΔP is 
the difference between P and PI (Equation 2). 
   (2) 
Equation 2 can be simplified to: 
   (3) 
Both P and PI are known values; therefore the denominator of Equation 3 can be called α.  
   (4) 
Solving for Q yields the equation used to calculate equilibrium quantity supplied without 
zoning (Q) (Equation 5). 
  (5) 
The estimates for Q at the three levels of zoning reduction for each ηd value are 
displayed in Tables 5-8. Q increases with a reduction in the zoning tax due to the shift in 





(Q −QI ) / [(Q +QI ) / 2]
(P − PI ) / [(P + PI ) / 2]
ηd =
(Q −QI ) / (Q +QI )
(P − PI ) / (P + PI )
ηd =






small have negligible increases in Q, corresponding to small reductions in P. Areas with a 
larger zoning tax, such as San Francisco or Boston, see large increases to Q when the tax 
is reduced. This additional supply is the effect of reducing or eliminating zoning 
regulation. The increase to Q results in a lower equilibrium price (P). Notice that as ηd 
increases, representing an increase in elasticity of the demand curve, the increase in Q 
from zoning reduction becomes larger. The range of estimates for Q is necessary because 
a definitive value for ηd is unknown. The estimates vary significantly. It is also likely that 
ηd is different in each metropolitan area.        
It is possible that some cities have significant zoning regulations in place but still 
have a low calculated implicit zoning tax percentage due to a lack of demand as a result 
of no population growth. The zoning regulations are essentially non-binding in these 
instances.    
It should be noted that such a significant increase in quantity supplied and the 
corresponding reduction in housing prices from zoning deregulation will certainly hurt 
incumbent homeowners, landlords, and owners of apartments. This is especially true in 
high-cost housing markets. However, many apartment renters, home renters, and people 
living with family or roommates will be able to afford to own a house and this is 
undoubtedly a benefit to society. Reforms to land-use restrictions must happen over a 
period of time to allow the market and individuals to adjust. 
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[ηd	  =	  -­‐.3]	  
Quantity	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Atlanta	   1,227,569 	  1,388,813	   	  1,340,469	   	  1,298,148	   
Baltimore	   681,857 	  747,781	   	  728,840	   	  711,694	   
Boston	   419,455 	  514,598	   	  483,004	   	  457,643	   
Chicago	   1,814,279 	  2,044,455	   	  1,975,810	   	  1,915,460	   
Cincinnati	   548,390 	  565,258	   	  560,834	   	  556,552	   
Cleveland	   547,601 	  577,653	   	  569,489	   	  561,784	   
Dallas	   904,726 	  980,326	   	  958,971	   	  939,388	   
Detroit	   415,753 	  443,146	   	  435,590	   	  428,537	   
Houston	   1,288,302 	  1,326,071	   	  1,316,186	   	  1,306,605	   
Kansas	  City	   527,391 	  526,952	   	  527,061	   	  527,171	   
Los	  Angeles	   1,481,122 	  1,822,520	   	  1,708,750	   	  1,617,713	   
Miami	   455,142 	  520,044	   	  500,328	   	  483,251	   
Milwaukee	   373,765 	  384,385	   	  381,609	   	  378,916	   
Minneapolis	   900,327 	  962,542	   	  945,305	   	  929,268	   
New	  York	   1,670,606 	  1,981,482	   	  1,882,414	   	  1,799,966	   
Newark	   474,406 	  572,172	   	  540,368	   	  514,368	   
Philadelphia	   984,992 	  1,042,964	   	  1,027,128	   	  1,012,241	   
Phoenix	   954,941 	  1,038,625	   	  1,014,860	   	  993,155	   
Pittsburgh	   688,195 	  689,236	   	  688,975	   	  688,715	   
Riverside	   802,224 	  860,457	   	  844,247	   	  829,218	   
San	  Diego	   573,530 	  714,565	   	  666,873	   	  629,214	   
San	  Francisco	   337,415 	  470,651	   	  419,735	   	  384,074	   
Seattle	   636,078 	  807,280	   	  748,142	   	  702,354	   
St.	  Louis	   772,434 	  773,653	   	  773,348	   	  773,043	   








[ηd	  =	  -­‐.5]	  
Quantity	  w/	  


















Atlanta	   1,227,569 	  1,508,614	   	  1,421,687	   	  1,347,498	   
Baltimore	   681,857 	  795,389	   	  762,002	   	  732,321	   
Boston	   419,455 	  590,996	   	  531,003	   	  485,093	   
Chicago	   1,814,279 	  2,214,845	   	  2,091,732	   	  1,986,109	   
Cincinnati	   548,390 	  576,794	   	  569,287	   	  562,061	   
Cleveland	   547,601 	  598,621	   	  584,574	   	  571,445	   
Dallas	   904,726 	  1,034,336	   	  996,977	   	  963,244	   
Detroit	   415,753 	  462,433	   	  449,349	   	  437,280	   
Houston	   1,288,302 	  1,351,872	   	  1,335,114	   	  1,318,953	   
Kansas	  City	   527,391 	  526,659	   	  526,842	   	  527,025	   
Los	  Angeles	   1,481,122 	  2,097,475	   	  1,880,987	   	  1,715,994	   
Miami	   455,142 	  568,709	   	  533,030	   	  502,974	   
Milwaukee	   373,765 	  391,634	   	  386,930	   	  382,390	   
Minneapolis	   900,327 	  1,006,463	   	  976,559	   	  949,084	   
New	  York	   1,670,606 	  2,222,997	   	  2,039,196	   	  1,891,918	   
Newark	   474,406 	  649,369	   	  589,685	   	  542,933	   
Philadelphia	   984,992 	  1,083,545	   	  1,056,234	   	  1,030,829	   
Phoenix	   954,941 	  1,098,611	   	  1,056,939	   	  1,019,492	   
Pittsburgh	   688,195 	  689,931	   	  689,495	   	  689,061	   
Riverside	   802,224 	  901,686	   	  873,506	   	  847,724	   
San	  Diego	   573,530 	  829,577	   	  738,026	   	  669,440	   
San	  Francisco	   337,415 	  593,135	   	  486,760	   	  418,937	   
Seattle	   636,078 	  949,538	   	  834,504	   	  750,513	   
St.	  Louis	   772,434 	  774,467	   	  773,957	   	  773,449	   








[ηd	  =	  -­‐.7]	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Atlanta	   1,227,569 	  1,639,912	   	  1,508,209	   	  1,398,816	   
Baltimore	   681,857 	  846,278	   	  796,761	   	  753,569	   
Boston	   419,455 	  681,005	   	  584,396	   	  514,317	   
Chicago	   1,814,279 	  2,400,978	   	  2,214,968	   	  2,059,485	   
Cincinnati	   548,390 	  588,573	   	  577,871	   	  567,626	   
Cleveland	   547,601 	  620,385	   	  600,072	   	  581,276	   
Dallas	   904,726 	  1,091,532	   	  1,036,567	   	  987,724	   
Detroit	   415,753 	  482,606	   	  463,559	   	  446,206	   
Houston	   1,288,302 	  1,378,188	   	  1,354,318	   	  1,331,418	   
Kansas	  City	   527,391 	  526,367	   	  526,622	   	  526,878	   
Los	  Angeles	   1,481,122 	  2,422,353	   	  2,072,885	   	  1,820,713	   
Miami	   455,142 	  622,488	   	  568,049	   	  523,545	   
Milwaukee	   373,765 	  399,023	   	  392,327	   	  385,896	   
Minneapolis	   900,327 	  1,052,505	   	  1,008,890	   	  969,334	   
New	  York	   1,670,606 	  2,498,717	   	  2,210,454	   	  1,988,876	   
Newark	   474,406 	  738,861	   	  644,041	   	  573,198	   
Philadelphia	   984,992 	  1,125,784	   	  1,086,194	   	  1,049,767	   
Phoenix	   954,941 	  1,162,318	   	  1,100,855	   	  1,046,551	   
Pittsburgh	   688,195 	  690,626	   	  690,016	   	  689,408	   
Riverside	   802,224 	  945,011	   	  903,825	   	  866,655	   
San	  Diego	   573,530 	  967,141	   	  817,839	   	  712,450	   
San	  Francisco	   337,415 	  759,383	   	  566,805	   	  457,341	   
Seattle	   636,078 	  1,122,903	   	  932,359	   	  802,266	   
St.	  Louis	   772,434 	  775,282	   	  774,567	   	  773,855	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Atlanta	   1,227,569 	  1,784,447	   	  1,600,574	   	  1,452,221	   
Baltimore	   681,857 	  900,797	   	  833,235	   	  775,464	   
Boston	   419,455 	  788,618	   	  644,143	   	  545,492	   
Chicago	   1,814,279 	  2,605,142	   	  2,346,234	   	  2,135,751	   
Cincinnati	   548,390 	  600,600	   	  586,588	   	  573,246	   
Cleveland	   547,601 	  642,992	   	  616,000	   	  591,281	   
Dallas	   904,726 	  1,152,205	   	  1,077,839	   	  1,012,855	   
Detroit	   415,753 	  503,728	   	  478,245	   	  455,322	   
Houston	   1,288,302 	  1,405,033	   	  1,373,805	   	  1,344,004	   
Kansas	  City	   527,391 	  526,075	   	  526,403	   	  526,732	   
Los	  Angeles	   1,481,122 	  2,812,108	   	  2,288,015	   	  1,932,524	   
Miami	   455,142 	  682,228	   	  605,642	   	  545,018	   
Milwaukee	   373,765 	  406,556	   	  397,802	   	  389,435	   
Minneapolis	   900,327 	  1,100,826	   	  1,042,355	   	  990,033	   
New	  York	   1,670,606 	  2,816,462	   	  2,398,288	   	  2,091,258	   
Newark	   474,406 	  843,839	   	  704,249	   	  605,318	   
Philadelphia	   984,992 	  1,169,783	   	  1,117,048	   	  1,069,063	   
Phoenix	   954,941 	  1,230,105	   	  1,146,731	   	  1,074,362	   
Pittsburgh	   688,195 	  691,322	   	  690,538	   	  689,755	   
Riverside	   802,224 	  990,597	   	  935,260	   	  886,025	   
San	  Diego	   573,530 	  1,134,610	   	  907,995	   	  758,544	   
San	  Francisco	   337,415 	  997,954	   	  664,069	   	  499,853	   
Seattle	   636,078 	  1,338,832	   	  1,044,165	   	  858,033	   
St.	  Louis	   772,434 	  776,097	   	  775,178	   	  774,261	   




C. CALCULATION OF DWL AND ZONING TAX 
The DWL caused by the zoning tax for each metropolitan area is calculated for a 
ηd of -.5. Refer to Figure 3 for a graphical depiction of DWL caused by zoning 
regulation. Glaeser and Gyourko (2002) assume an infinite price elasticity of supply in 
their original calculations of the intensive and imputed cost of land. The same assumption 
is adopted in this paper in order to maintain consistency and because the assumption of a 
perfectly elastic supply curve is close to being accurate and makes computation much 
easier. Green et al. (2005) show that the vast majority of markets in the U.S. have a 
relatively high price elasticity supply, with 30 of the 45 markets in their study having 
values greater than 4. There are a few markets where this assumption is not ideal, most 
notably San Francisco, which actually shows evidence of a slightly inelastic housing 
supply curve. However, the assumption is appropriate for the preponderance of markets 
studied. The DWL for each metropolitan area is calculated using Equation 6. 
 DWL = 12 [(P
I − P)(Q −QI )]  (6) 
The values for DWL are displayed in column 2 of Table 9. This DWL represents 
the loss to society that is a result of zoning regulation.  
Table 9.   Estimated DWL 
Metropolitan	  Area	   DWL	  
Atlanta	   	  $7,701,585,925	   
Baltimore	   	  $4,100,631,509	   
Boston	   	  $15,500,862,269	   
Chicago	   	  $14,290,517,354	   
Cincinnati	   	  $207,233,800	   
Cleveland	   	  $581,391,111	   
Dallas	   	  $2,417,846,396	   
Detroit	   	  $346,294,942	   
Houston	   	  $412,980,556	   
Kansas	  City	   	  $158,723	   
Los	  Angeles	   	  $63,087,476,381	   
Miami	   	  $3,742,496,065	   
Milwaukee	   	  $153,758,774	   
Minneapolis	   	  $2,165,725,495	   
 32 
Metropolitan	  Area	   DWL	  
New	  York	   	  $54,978,820,593	   
Newark	   	  $14,818,910,523	   
Philadelphia	   	  $2,092,035,557	   
Phoenix	   	  $2,752,841,801	   
Pittsburgh	   	  $542,004	   
Riverside	   	  $2,226,174,884	   
San	  Diego	   	  $26,454,054,167	   
San	  Francisco	   	  $65,284,286,739	   
Seattle	   	  $28,883,735,348	   
St.	  Louis	   	  $827,216	   
Tampa	   	  $37,937,273	   
 
The estimates for P and DWL are suggestive, not definitive. However, they still 
give an excellent general idea of the extreme cost of zoning regulation in many 
metropolitan areas. The size of the DWL in some markets such as New York, San 
Francisco, and Los Angeles is enormous. It is hard to image that any external costs 
caused by an expansion of residential housing could come close to the DWL from zoning 
regulation.  
The total cost of the zoning tax for high-cost markets is simply staggering. As 
mentioned earlier, much of the zoning tax “revenue” is similar to a DWL because it is 
due to land that is being withheld from development as opposed to revenue being 
collected for land-use restrictions such as permit fees. The combination of this massive 
total effective DWL and inefficient transfer of wealth to local governments for 
redistribution in high-cost markets is like an anchor impeding real economic growth.  
D. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DWL AND REGULATION 
Malpezzi (1996) provides an index of land-use regulation for 56 metropolitan 
areas. The index considers seven different variables of zoning regulation, including mean 
time for permit approval, total single-family zoned acreage, and percentage of zoning 
changes approved. The index ranges from 7 to 35, with 7 being the lowest amount of 
regulation and 35 being the highest. The Malpezzi (1996) regulation index covers only 23 
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of the 25 metropolitan areas in this paper, with Seattle and Riverside being omitted. The 
regulation index for the 23 metropolitan areas covered are in Table 10. 




Atlanta	   20 
Baltimore	   20 
Boston	   26 
Chicago	   13 
Cincinnati	   22 
Cleveland	   21 
Dallas	   15 
Detroit	   17 
Houston	   21 
Kansas	  City	   19 
Los	  Angeles	   25 
Miami	   24 
Milwaukee	   18 
Minneapolis	   16 
New	  York	   26 
Newark	   25 
Philadelphia	   24 
Phoenix	   18 
Pittsburgh	   23 
San	  Diego	   26 
San	  Francisco	   29 
St.	  Louis	   16 
Tampa	   17 
 
A linear regression is performed of the estimated DWL values (column 2 of Table 
9) on the regulation index values (column 2 Table 10) for these 23 metropolitan areas, 
with DWL as the dependent variable and the regulation index as the independent 
variable. The results of the regression analysis are displayed in Table 11. 
As expected, there is a statistically significant positive correlation between the 
measure of land-use regulation and estimated DWL from the zoning tax, with a p-value 
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of .00154 and R2 of .3864. According to this model, an increase of 1 unit in the regulation 
index will result in an increase of approximately $3.0 Billion in DWL.  
The correlation between the land-use regulation index created by Malpezzi (1996) 
and the measure of DWL calculated in this paper adds additional weight to the theory that 
zoning restrictions are the primary driver of housing supply constraints and high housing 
prices in many metropolitan areas.  
Table 11.   Linear Regression of DWL on Regulation Index 
Regression	  Statistics	   	  
Intercept	   -­‐50,491,273,473.1703	  
Regulation	  Index	  Coefficient	  	   2,998,811,860.8232	  
R	   0.6216	  
R2	   0.3864	  
Standard	  Error	   1.64897E+10	  
N	   23	  
Significance	  level	  (α)	   .05	  
p-­‐value	   0.00154	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IV. NET EFFECT ON BAH RATES 
A. BAH METHODOLOGY 
The Defense Travel Management Office (DTMO) calculates Basic Allowance for 
Housing (BAH) rates annually for 364 Military Housing Areas (MHAs). The three 
components of the BAH rate calculation are median market rent, average utilities, and 
average renter’s insurance (Primer on BAH, 2013). The data used to determine median 
rent are collected from multiple sources, including real estate rental listings, real estate 
management companies, real estate professionals, and base housing offices. Data are 
collected for apartments, townhouses, and single-family houses. Each rank is tied to a 
specific type of housing unit, which varies based on dependent status. “With dependents” 
means the service member is married or has a dependent child. Having dependents 
entitles the service member to a higher BAH rate. The BAH rate for the rank of O-3 with 
dependents, which uses the average market rent for a 3-bedroom detached single-family 
house, is used as the baseline BAH rate in this paper (Primer on BAH, 2013). The data 
for utilities are gathered from the American Community Survey (ACS), while the average 
cost of renter’s insurance is determined using data from major insurance companies 
(Primer on BAH, 2013).  
DTMO provides a BAH component breakdown for each MHA. The percentage 
breakdown for rent, utilities, and insurance is calculated as an average value across all 
ranks. Median rent makes up the majority of the BAH rate calculation. For the 364 
MHAs in 2012 it averaged 75.9%, with a low of 61% and a high of 91% (BAH 
Component Breakdown, 2012). 
  In 2012, total BAH outlays were approximately $19 Billion for the Department 
of Defense (DOD), not including supplemental appropriations or Overseas Contingency 
Operations (OCO) funding (Air Force Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Estimate, 2011; Army 
Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Estimate, 2011; Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 2012 
President’s Budget, 2011). BAH outlays were for active duty service members in the 
Navy, Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force. BAH obligations comprise approximately 
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13% of the DOD’s military personnel costs (National Defense Budget Estimates, 2013). 
This is a significant budget obligation that is directly influenced by rent and, ultimately, 
housing prices.   
Rent and house prices are highly correlated. This comes as no surprise because 
theoretically the price of a house should be the present value of all future rental income 
minus expenses. The rent-price ratio is the primary metric used to measure the 
relationship between house prices and rent. The rent-price ratio is simply the average 
annual rent divided by median house price. Historically, this ratio has remained 
remarkably constant, averaging approximately 5% (Davis et al., 2008). Between 1960 
and 1995, the rent-price ratio varied only from 4.8% to 6%. During this same period, 
house prices and rents increased in real terms at approximately the same rate (Davis et 
al., 2008). However, after 1995 the rate began a sharp decline, bottoming out in 2006 at 
approximately 3.5%. This unprecedented decline in the rent-price ratio from 1996 to 
2006 happened concurrently with an extraordinary rise in housing prices across the U.S., 
leading many to believe there was a housing bubble (Shiller, 2005). Between 2006 and 
2012 the rent-price ratio climbed back to its historical level of 5% (Gross Rent-Price 
Ratio, 2014). This reversion to the historical mean confirms the importance of the rent-
price ratio as a valuable metric and the close correlation between house prices and rent. 
B. CALCULATION OF BAH RATES WITHOUT ZONING TAX 
Any reduction in the price of housing will result in a proportional decrease in rent 
over the long run. BAH rates for the rank of O-3 with dependents in each metropolitan 
area is displayed in column 3 of Table 12. A linear regression analysis of the 2012 BAH 
rate on the 2012 Median House Price (PI) is performed. The results are displayed in Table 
14. The results show a statistically significant strong positive correlation between BAH 
and median house price. This outcome reinforces the high correlation between rent and 
house prices because rent makes up the majority of the BAH rate.      
The percentage of BAH that is comprised of median rent is provided in column 5 
of Table 12. To calculate the decrease in BAH resulting from a 100% reduction to the 
zoning tax, the calculated implicit zoning tax percentage from Table 3 is multiplied by 
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rent as a percent of BAH (column 5, Table 12) and the BAH rate (column 3, Table 12). 
The result is subtracted from the BAH rate to yield the BAH rate with a 100% zoning tax 
reduction. These values are displayed in column 4 of Table 13. Calculations for the BAH 
rate with a 75% and a 50% reduction to the zoning tax are also calculated by adjusting 
the implicit zoning tax percentage accordingly. These values are in columns 5 and 6 of 
Table 13, respectively.  
The results show significant decreases in many high-cost areas. San Diego, which 
has a large military population due to numerous Navy and Marine Corps bases, shows an 
estimated BAH reduction of 47% with a complete elimination of the zoning tax. While a 
100% reduction of the zoning tax is likely to be politically infeasible, as discussed earlier, 
these results are still valuable because they show the significant decreases to both rent 
prices and government spending on BAH entitlements that are possible from zoning 
regulation reform. A more reasonable reduction to the zoning tax of 50% still yields an 
estimated 24% decrease to the BAH rate in San Diego. 
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Rent	  as	  a	  %	  
of	  BAH	  Rate	  
Atlanta	   	  $160,800	  	   	  $1,470	   34.08% 75% 
Baltimore	   	  $271,100	  	   	  $2,238	   26.65% 80% 
Boston	   	  $356,500	  	   	  $2,913	   50.69% 82% 
Chicago	   	  $215,100	  	   	  $2,031	   33.17% 81% 
Cincinnati	   	  $151,800	  	   	  $1,449	   9.61% 74% 
Cleveland	   	  $139,400	  	   	  $1,452	   16.35% 75% 
Dallas	   	  $158,200	  	   	  $1,782	   23.58% 77% 
Detroit	   	  $77,200	  	   	  $1,773	   19.22% 78% 
Houston	   	  $141,400	  	   	  $1,995	   9.19% 81% 
Kansas	  City	   	  $156,000	  	   	  $1,416	   -­‐0.28% 76% 
Los	  Angeles	   	  $399,500	  	   	  $2,625	   51.24% 89% 
Miami	   	  $181,500	  	   	  $2,190	   36.31% 83% 
Milwaukee	   	  $192,900	  	   	  $1,560	   8.92% 76% 
Minneapolis	   	  $203,700	  	   	  $1,872	   20.03% 82% 
New	  York	   	  $450,300	  	   	  $3,027	   44.21% 81% 
Newark	   	  $356,700	  	   	  $2,550	   47.49% 77% 
Philadelphia	   	  $244,000	  	   	  $2,253	   17.40% 77% 
Phoenix	   	  $156,100	  	   	  $1,611	   24.55% 79% 
Pittsburgh	   	  $124,300	  	   	  $1,929	   0.50% 79% 
Riverside	   	  $214,100	  	   	  $1,914	   20.91% 86% 
San	  Diego	   	  $386,400	  	   	  $2,316	   53.48% 88% 
San	  Francisco	   	  $719,800	  	   	  $3,015	   70.94% 91% 
Seattle	   	  $325,200	  	   	  $2,049	   56.67% 82% 
St.	  Louis	   	  $155,200	  	   	  $1,653	   0.52% 76% 































Atlanta	   	  $160,800	  	   	  $1,470	   	  $1,094	  	   	  $1,188	   	  $1,282	   
Baltimore	   	  $271,100	  	   	  $2,238	   	  $1,761	  	   	  $1,880	   	  $1,999	   
Boston	   	  $356,500	  	   	  $2,913	   	  $1,702	  	   	  $2,005	   	  $2,308	   
Chicago	   	  $215,100	  	   	  $2,031	   	  $1,485	  	   	  $1,622	   	  $1,758	   
Cincinnati	   	  $151,800	  	   	  $1,449	   	  $1,346	  	   	  $1,372	   	  $1,397	   
Cleveland	   	  $139,400	  	   	  $1,452	   	  $1,274	  	   	  $1,318	   	  $1,363	   
Dallas	   	  $158,200	  	   	  $1,782	   	  $1,458	  	   	  $1,539	   	  $1,620	   
Detroit	   	  $77,200	  	   	  $1,773	   	  $1,507	  	   	  $1,574	   	  $1,640	   
Houston	   	  $141,400	  	   	  $1,995	   	  $1,847	  	   	  $1,884	   	  $1,921	   
Kansas	  City	   	  $156,000	  	   	  $1,416	   	  $1,419	  	   	  $1,418	   	  $1,417	   
Los	  Angeles	   	  $399,500	  	   	  $2,625	   	  $1,428	  	   	  $1,727	   	  $2,026	   
Miami	   	  $181,500	  	   	  $2,190	   	  $1,530	  	   	  $1,695	   	  $1,860	   
Milwaukee	   	  $192,900	  	   	  $1,560	   	  $1,454	  	   	  $1,481	   	  $1,507	   
Minneapolis	   	  $203,700	  	   	  $1,872	   	  $1,564	  	   	  $1,641	   	  $1,718	   
New	  York	   	  $450,300	  	   	  $3,027	   	  $1,943	  	   	  $2,214	   	  $2,485	   
Newark	   	  $356,700	  	   	  $2,550	   	  $1,618	  	   	  $1,851	   	  $2,084	   
Philadelphia	   	  $244,000	  	   	  $2,253	   	  $1,951	  	   	  $2,027	   	  $2,102	   
Phoenix	   	  $156,100	  	   	  $1,611	   	  $1,299	  	   	  $1,377	   	  $1,455	   
Pittsburgh	   	  $124,300	  	   	  $1,929	   	  $1,921	  	   	  $1,923	   	  $1,925	   
Riverside	   	  $214,100	  	   	  $1,914	   	  $1,570	  	   	  $1,656	   	  $1,742	   
San	  Diego	   	  $386,400	  	   	  $2,316	   	  $1,226	  	   	  $1,499	   	  $1,771	   
San	  Francisco	   	  $719,800	  	   	  $3,015	   	  $1,069	  	   	  $1,555	   	  $2,042	   
Seattle	   	  $325,200	  	   	  $2,049	   	  $1,097	  	   	  $1,335	   	  $1,573	   
St.	  Louis	   	  $155,200	  	   	  $1,653	   	  $1,646	  	   	  $1,648	   	  $1,650	   




Table 14.   Linear Regression of BAH Rate on PI 
Regression	  Statistics	   	  
Intercept	   1349.1160	  
PI	  Coefficient	   0.0029	  
R	   0.83165	  
R2	   0.69164	  
Standard	  Error	   275.09985	  
N	   25	  
Significance	  level	  (α)	   .05	  





While the calculations in this paper are suggestive, the results show the significant 
cost imposed by zoning regulation. The net loss to society for the benefit of incumbent 
homeowners is particularly severe in the high-cost markets. The unrealized potential that 
exists is significant if the burden of the zoning tax can be lifted or eased, even by a small 
amount. Local governments can address negative externalities from land development in 
more efficient ways, such as infrastructure development. These externalities can also be 
internalized through private bargaining via covenants and homeowner associations 
(HOAs), as opposed to coerced regulation. 
Why do nearly all zoning regulations and other land-use restrictions favor single-
family homes and existing homeowners above all else? Fischel (2004) believes it began 
with a shift in judicial preferences during the early 20th century, favoring single-family 
homes as representing American ideals. In the 1970s the power of existing suburban 
homeowners increased due to a transition toward even more burdensome and restrictive 
land-use regulations throughout the country (Quigley & Rosenthal, 2005). The primary 
reason for the continuation of such onerous land-use restrictions in so many metropolitan 
areas is likely the concentrated benefits they provide to the existing local homeowners, 
while the significant costs are dispersed primarily to renters and budding home buyers.  
Reducing zoning regulation will lower housing costs, increase homeownership in 
a sustainable and permanent way, and result in real economic growth. This significant net 
benefit to society should not be abdicated to the interests of one group.  
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